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Abstract  
It is well know that transport charges are not symmetric: fronthaul and backhaul 
costs on a route may differ, because they are affected by the distribution of economic 
acitivities. This paper develops a two-regional general equilibrium model in which 
transport costs are determined endogenously as a result of a search and matching 
process. It is shown that economies or diseconomies of transport density emerge, 
depending on the search costs of transport firms and the relative importance of the 
possibility of backhaul transportation. It is found that the symmetry of the 
distribution of economic activity may break owing to economies of transport density 
when the additional search costs are small enough. 
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11. Introduction
North (1958) pointed out that When one focuses on freight rates and their immediate
e¤ect upon economic change, it is all too easy to lose sight of the larger context of which
the costs of ocean transportation were only a part. The fall in freight rates, it is true,
was essential to an international economy, but the fall itself was a result of the expansion
of trade.... In the overall framework of New Economic Geography (NEG), it has been
shown that the spatial conguration of economic activity depends on the balance between
agglomeration forces and dispersion forces. To avoid complication, typical NEG models
utilize exogenous and symmetric transport costs over a route to determine the balance
between two forces. However, some analysis in NEG have used endogenous or asymmetric
transport costs. Mori and Nishikimi (2002) examined the e¤ect of economies of transport
density on the interdependence between industrial location behavior and the transport
network, while Behrens and Gaigne (2006) and Behrens, Gaigne, Ottaviano and Thisse
(2006) examined the e¤ect of (dis) economies of transport density. In these analyses,
the relationship between transport costs and transport quantity is given exogenously.
Behrens (2006) examined the e¤ects of asymmetric but exogenous transport costs between
two regions. Takahashi (2006) explicitly incorporated an endogenous transport sector and
analyzed the adoption of modern transport technologies, such as highways or a high-speed
train system. Behrens, Gaigne and Thisse (2009) considered prot-maximizing carriers
and examined the relationships between transport costs, industry location and welfare.
Their model is an extension of the model of Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) in
which quasi-linear utility is used. Takahashi (2011) also explicitly introduced carriers
into a Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz type model. Transport costs became higher in the binding
direction (Takahashi 2011) or under the asymmety of the distribution of manufacturing
rms (Behrens, Gaigne and Thisse 2009).
In a di¤erent approach from that of NEG, some analyses have considered equilibrium
transport charges, give nthe distribution of economic activity or peak and o¤-peak trans-
port ow. Our paper is very close to the analysis of De Vany and Saving (1977) which
built a model of a two-region competitive trucking industry with the greatest tra¢ c ow
in a region and derived equilibrium transport charges such that the full price of shipping a
unit load for the fronthaul market is the marginal hauling cost plus the inventory holding
costs in the fronthaul minus the inventory holding costs in the backhaul. De Vany and
Saving (1977) counted the waiting time as a cost, so large tra¢ c ow in a region lowered
the cost of transport from the region. Furthermore, the imbalance of transport ow over
a route was included in the transport charges from a region with a larger tra¢ c ow.
From historical cases, North (1958) pointed out that the existence of backhaul freight
reduces freight rates. These points are well studied in empirical works and it is natural
to incorporate these phenomena into an NEG model.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a micro foundation for both a transport market
with imperfect information and the spatial distribution of manufacturing rms. That is,
the distribution of manufacturing rms a¤ects transport charges in transport markets and
the transport charges a¤ects the price of manufactured goods and also the distribution of
manufacturing rms. Our setup is a combination of two existing models. For describing
a transport market with imperfect information, we use monopolistic competition models
2with search and matching process, such as those of Wolinsky (1983) and Anderson and
Renault (1999), instead of directly adopting the model of De Vany and Saving (1977).
The other model we use is a footloose capital model (Baldwin et.al. 2003 Ch. 5 and
Ottaviano and Thisse 2004 Ch.58) in which the repatriation of capital returns to the
owner is allowed. The original footloose capital model shows that, assuming symmetric
regions, a symmetric distribution of rms is always an equilibrium but a core-periphery
structure is not an equilibrium. This is only because the agglomeration of manufacturing
rms causes harsh price competition. In our setting, endogenized transport costs lead to
agglomeration forces or dispersion forces, depending on the circumstances of the transport
market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is described. In
Section 3 the properties of variables for a given distribution of capital are examined. In
Section 4 the spatial equilibrium is established and characterized. Finally, in Section 5
some concludes are given.
2. Model
The economy involves three sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and transport), two
production factors (labor and capital) and two regions (1 and 2). The world population
is perfectly inelastic and equal to L; the world supply of capital is also perfectly inelastic
and equal to K. Owners of capital provide labor inputs. Half of the labor and half of
the capital are in each region. Consumers are immobile but, in contrast, capital is mobile
between regions. More precisely, the distribution of the owners of capital is exogenously
given, but capital returns are repatriated to the owner when the distribution of the demand
of capital is asymmetric between regions. Hence, the size of regional income is the same
for both regions. Let s represent the share of capital used by manufacturing rms in
region 1.
2.1. Preferences
Preferences over a homogeneous good and horizontally di¤erentiated goods are shared
among consumers, which is supposed to be symmetric in all varieties of manufactured
goods. We assume that there is a continuum of rms so that an unknown manufacturing
rm can be described by a density function. We also assume that the utility is quasi-linear
and the subutility is quadratic. A consumer solves the following problem:
max
q1(i);q0
U  
Z N
0
q1(i)di     
2
Z N
0
[q1(i)]
2di  
2
h Z N
0
q1(i)di
i2
+ q0; (1)
s:t:
Z N
0
p1(i)q1(i)di+ p0q0 = y1 + q0 (2)
where q1(i) and p1(i) represent the quantity and price of the consumption of variety
i 2 [0; N ] of manufactured goods, q0 and p0 the quantity and price of the consumption
of the numéraire, y1 is the individual income in region 1 and q0 is the initial endowment
supposed to be su¢ ciently large for the equilibrium consumption of the numéraire to be
positive. The restrictions of parameters in (1) are  > 0;  >  > 0. For a given value
3of , the parameter  represents the substitutability between varieties: the higher , the
closer the substitution.
In the following, we focus on region 1. Results for region 2 can be derived by sym-
metry. We focus on the case where individuals consume both the agricultural good and
manufactured goods.
Each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor and earns the wage prevailing
in her regional labor market. She also supplies one unit of capital in the country where
she resides. The capital return she receives stems from competition among national
entrepreneurs who want to launch a manufacturing rm.
From (1) and (2), we obtain the demand for variety i 2 [0; N ] of manufactured goods
in region 1:
q1(i) = a  bp1(i) + c
Z N
0
[p1(j)  p1(i)]dj; i 2 [0; N ] (3)
where a  =[+(N 1)], b  1=[+(N 1)], and c  =( )[+(N 1)]. Since we
suppose the demand functions are symmetric for each variety, the prices of manufactured
goods are also symmetric. Using this assumption and (3), the individual demand in region
1 faced by a representative manufacturing rm located in region 1 is
q11 = a  (b+ cN)p11 + c[sp11 + (1  s)p21]N; (4)
and the individual demand in region 2 faced by a manufacturing rm located in region 1
is
q12 = a  (b+ cN)p12 + c[sp12 + (1  s)p22]N; (5)
where p11 is the price in region 1 of manufactured goods produced locally, whereas p12 is
the price of manufactured goods exported from region 1 to region 2. In all cases, if there
are two subscripts, the former indicates the region where the goods are produced and the
latter the region where the goods are consumed.
2.2. Consumption goods sector
There are two types of consumption goods. The rst good is a homogenous agricultural
good produced using a constant-returns technology under perfect competition. One unit
of the agricultural good is produced by one unit of labor input. The agricultural good
is assumed to be traded costlessly between regions. Assuming the agricultural good
is produced in both regions, the choice of this good as the numéraire implies that, in
equilibrium, the wage rates of agricultural workers and the prices of the agricultural good
in both regions are one.
The second consumption goods consists of horizontally di¤erentiated products by man-
ufacturing rms. Each manufacturing product is produced with the increasing returns
to scale technology under imperfect competition. A xed m units of capital inputs are
required to produce any quantity of a variety of manufactured goods and the marginal
capital input is zero. Because of increasing returns to scale technology and no scope
economies, there is a one-to-one relationship between manufacturing rm s and varieties
of manufactured goods.
4Preferences of economic agents and the technology of rms in each sector are supposed
to be identical across each variety. Manufacturing rms are able to segment markets,
that is, each manufacturing rm has the ability to set a price specic to the market in
which the product is sold. Since there is free entry and exit, the expected prots of a
manufacturing rm are zero. We assume that there is a continuum N of manufacturing
rms so that an unknown rm can be described by a density function. Given the foregoing
assumptions, clearing of the capital market for manufactured goods in each region implies
that
nM1 = sK=m n
M
2 = (1  s)K=m (6)
where nM1 is the number of manufacturing rm s in region 1 and s is the share of capital
used by manufacturing rm s in region 1. To transport manufactured goods to the remote
region, manufacturing rm s pay transport charge to transport rms, whereas transport
within a region is assumed to be costless for simplicity. The prot of a manufacturing
rm located in region 1, M1 , is
M1 = p11q11(p11)L=2 + (p12   t12) q12(p12)L=2 mrM1 (7)
where t12 is the charges for transportation of manufactured goods from region 1 to region
2 and rM1 is the capital return used by manufacturing rms in region 1.
2.3. Transport sector
The transport sector consists of services horizontally di¤erentiated by transport rms.
Each service is provided using increasing returns to scale technology under imperfect
competition. Because of increasing return to scale technology and no scope economies,
there is also a one-to-one relationship between transport rms and varieties of transport
services. Each transport rm requires a xed one unit of numéraire inputs and some
variable numéraire inputs. Transport rms are able to segment markets, that is, each
transport rm has the ability to set a transport charge specic to the market in which
the product is loaded onto transport equipment. Because there is free entry and exit, the
prots of a transport rm are zero.
We assume non-strategic behavior by transport rms, which is implied by our assump-
tion that a transport rm takes the total amount of transported goods to be given as
they solve their prot maximization problem. We assume that transport rms load all
amounts which manufacturing rms need to have transported. We may consider that this
assumption express the case when all amount of load is in a unit of a container. Then,
we may say that transport rms decide transport charges per container. Furthermore,
manufacturing rms do not try to change the amount to be sent during their contact
with transport rms. Hence, transport rms decide on their transport charge pre load,
given the total number of loads. Owing to the law of large numbers, manufacturing rms
and transport rms use expected transport costs in their prot function. Based on the
expected value, manufacturing rms maximize their prots.
The interaction between transport rms and manufacturing rm s is expressed by ap-
plying the mechanism rigorously examined in Anderson and Renault (1999). Transport
rms need to bear di¤erent additional adjustments costs, depending on the requests of
each manufacturing rm and transport demand. Each manufacturing rm has specic
5requests, such as time of colection and time of delivery. When transport rms can adjust
to each manufacturing rms specic requests easily or when they do not need to wait
to start their transport, the match between a transport rm and a manufacturing rm is
better and the transport rm can save additional costs such as inventory holding costs.
Furthermore, transport rms may adjust transport charges to reduce the di¤erence of
costs between fronthaul transportation and backhaul transportation. Hence, we suppose
that the sum of additional costs and hauling costs is given by h   1i   2i where 
is a scale parameter for fronthaul that expresses the heterogeneity of the match between
manufacturing rms and transport rms, and  is the corresponding scale parameter for
backhaul. The parameter 1i 2 [0; nM1 ] are a random variables for fronthaul that are inde-
pendent and identically distributed across manufacturing rms and transport rms, with
a common density function f and the corresponding distribution function F . Similarly,
2i 2 [0; nM2 ] are random variables for backhaul. Larger values of 1i or 2i mean smaller
adjustment costs. We suppose that h is large enough that h  1i   2i > 0. The con-
ditional prot function for transport rms for transporting a unit of manufactured goods
can be described by:
T12i(t12i) = t12i   (h  1i   2) (8)
where t12i is the full price of transport charge.1 Higher T12i implies larger t12i and lower
h 1i 2.2 The term 2 is replaced with the same expected value for all transport rms
which decide transport charges in region 1. Andersen and Renoult (1999) explained that
an equilibrium exists under monopolistic competition if the density f is log concave. The
uniform distribution has this property over a convex set. Suppose that a transport rm
holds a best o¤er with conditional prot T12j(t12j). If it contacts another manufacturing
rm i, at which it expects transport charge t, it will prefers to accept the request for
transportation if t   (h   1i) > tj   (h   1j), which is equivalent to 1i > x 
1j   (t   tj)=. We suppose a uniform distribution as follows:
f1(x1) = 1=n
M
1 for x1 2 [0; nM1 ] (9)
where x1  1j   (t   tj)=. Added conditional prots can be expressed as t   h +
1i   (tj   h + 1j) = (li   x). When transport rms do not accept the request
of manufacturing rm s, the transport rms advertise, wait for new requests, waste the
space on transport equipment, and try to contact manufacturing rms to nd a load to
be transported. We call these costs the search costs. If the costs for additional search per
unit of transport are, !, covered by the numéraire, the incremental conditional prot for
nding one more manufacturing rm is g(x) and the value of x when transport rms
stop searching, bx, is given by
!= = g(bx) where g(x) = Z nM1
x
(  x)f()d
1Recall is costless.
2Lower h 1i 2 means that manufacturing rms accept transport o¤ers more easily when matching
is good in region 1 and region 2.
6where g(x) is the expected value of nding a better matching than x. The expected
incremental conditional prot from a single extra search exceeds the search cost if x < bx,
whereas a single extra search yields a non-positive expected benet if x  bx.
The gross prots per unit of transport when a transport rm decide to transport a
variety of manufactured goods at transport charges t1 after contacting k1 manufacturing
rms is given by
T12(t12)  !k1.
At equilibrium, all transport rms have the same charge per unit of goods transported,
t. The prots of a transport rm located in region 1, T1 , are
T1 = (t12   c12) q12(p12)
L
2
nM1
nT
+ (t21   c21) q21(p21)L
2
nM2
nT
  1, (10)
where c12  h  1   2 + !k1 and c21  h  2   1 + !k2.
2.4. Capital ow
Capital moves between the two regions to equalize capital returns. The processes of
capital ow are expressed as follows:
_s  ds=dt =
8<:
r if 0 < sM < 1
maxf0;rg if sM = 0
minf0;rg if sM = 1,
where r  r1   r2. We dene the spatial equilibrium as the situation where capital
owners cannot earn a strictly higher rental rate by changing regions serviced by his/her
capital endowments. The spatial equilibrium condition for manufacturing rms is r = 0
if 0 < s < 1, r < 0 if s = 0, or r > 0 if s = 1.
3. Transport charge, price of products and capital returns
Given the distribution of rms, we start by considering the number of additional con-
tacts that a transport rm will make in order to clarify the properties of the search
process. Then, we proceed to determine transport charges. Using these transport charges,
the prices of manufactured goods are derived. Finally, we derive capital returns and the
number of transport rms.
3.1. Number of additional contacts
A transport rm stops searching and accepts the requests of a manufacturing rm if it
nds a manufacturing rm with requests such that x  bx. Otherwise, the transport rm
continues searching. Supposing 0 < F (bx) < 1, the transport rm stops searching at the
rst contact with a manufacturing rm with probability 1  F (bx), at the second contact
with probability F (bx)[1   F (bx)], at the third contact with probability F (bx)2[1   F (bx)]
etc. Summing up the probabilities that a transport rm stops searching, we obtain the
expected number of contacts as
ke = [1  F (bx)] X
nM1 =1
nM1 F (bx)nM1  1.
7Solving != = g(bx) yields
bx1 = nM1  q2nM1 !=, (11)
which is a quadratic function of
p
nM1 . Using (11), we obtain
bx1 R 0, nM1 =2 R !. (12)
The last inequality shows that the sign of the reservation value depends on the balance
between the expected returns from additional matching and the additional search costs.
When bx1 < 0, which implies the number of manufacturing rms is small, transport rms
stop searching at the rst contact. Whereas, when bx1  0, which implies the number of
manufacturing rms is large, transport rms try to contact another manufacturing rm.
Furthermore, if  goes to innity or ! goes to 0, we obtain bx1 = nM1 . In other words,
transport rms never stop searching and never accept any request for transportation
because adjustment entails huge costs, even if the adjustment is relatively easy and the
cost for additional contact is very small. Whereas, if bx1 < 0, transport rms always accept
a request from a manufacturing rm at the rst contact because the adjustment entails
small costs, even if it is relatively di¢ cult, and the cost for an additional contact is too
high. 3
Using (11), we obtain the probability when consumers do not accept a variety:
F (bx1) = 1 
s
2
nM1
!

. (13)
If the number of manufacturing rms is large enough such that nM1 > 2!=, we obtain
F (bx1) > 0. Using (13), we nd that we always obtain jF (bx1)j < 1. Thus, we obtain the ex-
pected number of contacts before a transport rm accepts the request of a manufacturing
rm:
ke =
1
1  F (bx1) =
r
nM1
2

!
. (14)
This is the inverse of the probability that a transport rm nds a manufacturing rm
with acceptable requests, 1   F (bx1). For example, if the probability is 1/3, a transport
rm expects to contact three manufacturing rms before agreeing to transport a load.
If the number of manufacturing rms is small enough that nM1  2!=, we obtain
F (bx1)  0. That means, consumers accept any requests if nM1  2!=. Hence, we nd
that the number of additional contacts k1 is 0 if n
M
1  2!=.
3.2. Transport charges
We suppose all transport rms except transport rm i set price t, given the number
of transport rms and manufacturing rms. Given that transport rm i is contacted,
3Note that the reservation value increases as the number of manufacturing rms becomes larger because
we obtain @bx1=@nM1 R 0 , nM1 R !=2.
8the probability of transport rm i accepting the request and sending the load of the
manufacturing rm is
Pr(x < bx) = 1  F (bx+),
where   (t   ti)= is the standardized transport return premium of transport rm i.
To determine the probability that transport rm i is contacted, we use the distribution
function for another transport rm being contacted rst and not accepting, F (bx). Focus-
ing on the case when nM1 > 2!=, the transport rm i is contacted rst with probability
1=nM1 , second with probability F (bx)=nM1 , third with probability F (bx)2=nM1 , etc. Sum-
ming, we obtain the probability as 1=nM1  [1   F (bx)nM1 ]=[1   F (bx)]. If nM1 is su¢ ciently
large, we can rewrite the probability as 1=nM1  1=[1  F (bx)]1. Thus, the probability that
rm i is contacted and accepted becomes 1=nM1  [1  F (bx+)] [1  F (bx)nM1 ]=[1  F (bx)].
Since no transport rm can contact all manufacturing rms, transport rm is demand in
region 1 is
D1(ti; t
) =
nM1 Q1
nT
[1  F (bx+)] 1  F (bx)nM1
1  F (bx) ,
where Q1 is the transport demand of a variety of manufactured goods in region 1 and nT
is the number of transport rms. The derivative of transport rm is demand in region 1
with respect to ti, evaluated at ti = t, is
@D1(t
; t)
@ti
=  n
M
1 Q1
nT
f(bx)

1  F (bx)nM1
1  F (bx) < 0.
At the equilibrium in which all transport rms charge the same, the demand for transport
services is D1(t; t) = nM1 Q1=n
T . Thus, we obtain transport charges where marginal
revenue equals marginal cost:
t12 = [1  F (bx1)]=f(bx1) + h  1i   2 + !k1
which is the condition given for monopolistic competition in the appendix of Anderson
and Renault (1999) if we set h  1i   2 + !k1 = 0.
If nM1  2!= and thus F (bx1) = 0, setting k1 = 0, we obtain t12 = h 1i 2, which
is the competitive price. In other words, not accepting all requests of manufacturing rms
can be regarded as a source of imperfect competition. Because we allow the case when
transport rms to agree to transport products at the rst contact with a manufacturing
rms, the expected match value E1 becomes n
M
1 =2. The part of transport costs t
 cor-
responding to mark-up, [1   F (bx)]=f(bx), can be written as p2!nM1 , which expresses
mark-up. This part increases with the search cost, !, and the scale parameter,  (Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 of Anderson and Renault (1999)). It also increases with a rise in the
number of manufacturing rms. This appears to be di¤erent from the result of Anderson
and Renault (1999) in which the price falls with an increase in the number of rms. This
di¤erence is simply because we focus only on monopolistic competition but Anderson and
Renault (1999) examined much wider cases. It possible to interpret our case as stating
that mark-up increases if a transport rm has a chance of a better matching.
9Using (14), the cost for contacting manufacturing rms, !k1, can be written as
p
nM1 !=2.
Thus, substituting nM2 = K=m  nM1 , if nM1 > 2!=, transport costs can be written as
t12 =
q
5!nM1 =2 + h  K=2m  (  )nM1 =2, (15)
whereas if nM1  2!=, transport costs can be written as
t12 = h  K=2m  (  )nM1 =2.
Proposition 1 The transport charges are determined by imperfect competition if the
number of manufacturing rms in the transport market is large enough that nM1 > 2!=,
whereas transport charges are equal to the marginal cost of transport rms if the number
of manufacturing rms are small enough that nM1  2!=.
It is readily veried that the core-periphery pattern provides a competitive transport
market in the periphery. However, an imperfect competitive transport market (a com-
petitive transport market) emerges in the core if K=m > 2!= (K=m  2!=). With
a symmetric pattern there is an imperfect competitive transport market (a competitive
transport market) if K=m > 4!= (K=m  4!=). In summary, we obtain the following
results. (1) If 0 < K=m  2!=, marginal cost pricing in the transport market may
exist in the core and the periphery, and with a symmetric distribution of capital. (2) If
2!= < K=m  4!=, marginal cost pricing in the transport market may exist in the
periphery and with a symmetric distribution of capital, whereas transport rms are un-
der imperfect competition in the core. (3) If 4!= < K=m, marginal cost pricing in the
transport market may exist in the periphery, whereas transport rms are under imperfect
competition in the core or with a symmetric distribution of capital.
Supposing nM1 > 2!= and substituting capital constraint n
M
2 = K=m  nM1 into (12),
it is straightforward to obtain:
@t12
@nM1
R 0, 5
2
!
(  )2 R n
M
1 if  > ; (16)
@t12
@nM1
> 0 if   . (17)
In other words, focusing on the case when a transport rm may not accept all requests,
if the scale parameter of the cost for backhaul, , is not smaller than that for fronthaul,
, transport charges decrease as the number of manufacturing rms increases. Otherwise,
transport charges increase (decrease) when the number of manufacturing rms are small
(large) as the number of manufacturing rms increase in the transport market. Economies
of dencity may emerge when transport rms do not care about backhaul and the number
of manufacturing rms is large enough.
On the other hand, supposing nM1  2!= and substituting capital constraint nM2 =
K=m  nM1 into transport charge h  nM1 =2  nM2 =2 yields
@t12
@nM1
R 0,  Q .
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That is, if transport rms accept any requests and the scale parameter for fronthaul is
larger than that for backhaul, transport charges decrease with an increase in the number
of manufacturing rms.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to obtain t12 = t21 if nM1 = n
M
2 = K=2m and also
@t12
@nM1
=   @t21
@nM1
.
That is, transport costs become asymmetric between regions if the distribution of man-
ufacturing rms is asymmetric. Furthermore, the size of marginal changes of transport
costs are the same between transport markets. However, when transport costs from re-
gion 1 to region 2 increase (decrease), transport costs from region 2 to region 1 decrease
(increase).
3.3. Prices of manufactured goods
Solving the rst-order conditions for a manufacturing rms prot maximization with
respect to the prices of manufactured goods yields the prices of manufactured goods
consumed in region 1:
p11( 21) =
2a+ t21cn
M
2
2(2b+ cK=m)
, (18)
p21( 21) =
2a+ t21(2b+ cK=m+ cn
M
2 )
2(2b+ cK=m)
. (19)
Similarly, the price of the manufactured goods transported from region 1 to region 2 are
p12( 12) =
2a+ t12(2b+ cK=m+ cn
M
1 )
2(2b+ cK=m)
. (20)
Substituting (15) into (20), we obtain the equilibrium price of the manufactured goods
transported from region 1 to region 2:
p12 =
2a+
p
5!nM1 =2 + h  nM1 =2  nM2 =2

(2b+ cK=m+ cnM1 )
2(2b+ cK=m)
. (21)
Similarly, the equilibrium price of the manufactured goods produced and consumed in
region 1 is
p11 =
2a+
p
5!nM2 =2 + h  nM2 =2  nM1 =2

cnM2
2(2b+ cK=m)
. (22)
Using (4), (5) and the rst-order conditions for a manufacturing rms prot maximization
with respect to the prices of manufactured goods, we obtain the quantities of individual
consumption of each manufactured good:
q11 = (b+ cK=m)p11 and (23)
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q12 = (b+ cK=m)(p12   t12). (24)
To obtain the su¢ cient condition for manufactured goods produced in region 1 to be
demanded in region 2, substituting (15), (21) and (24) into the condition p12   t12 > 0
which gives
2a=(2b+ cnM1 ) > t12 =
q
5!nM1 =2 + h  nM1 =2  nM2 =2. (25)
The left-hand side of (25) takes its minimum value when nM1 = K=m, whereas the right-
hand side of (25) takes its maximum value when nM1 = 5=2 != (  )2. Requiring that
the minimum value of the left-hand side is always larger than the maximum value of the
right-hand side, we obtain the condition
a >
2b+ cK=m
2

5
4
!
   + h  
K=m
2

. (26)
We suppose that (26) is always satised.
The ambiguity about the e¤ects of an increase in the number of manufacturing rms
on the price of manufactured goods remains. As explained in Ottaviano, Tabuch and
Thisse (2002), the prices of manufactured goods produced by both local and foreign
manufacturing rms fall when the number of local rms rises and the number of foreign
manufacturing rms falls, if the transport costs are xed. However, the e¤ects of an
increase in the number of manufacturing rms on the transport costs may change the
e¤ects of that increase on the price of manufactured goods. Using (22), we obtain
@p11
@nM2
R 0, (   )nM2 +
3
2
r
5
2
!nM2 + h  
K
2m
R 0;
which is simply a quadratic function of
p
nM2 . Because h   K=2m > 0, this model has
the same e¤ect of the number of manufacturing rms on the price of local products as
in the model of Ottaviano, Tabuch and Thisse (2002) if the scale parameter for backhaul
is not smaller than that for fronthaul (  ), or if the number of local manufacturing
rms is small and the scale parameter on backhaul is smaller than that on fronthaul
( < ). However, if the number of local manufacturing rms is large enough and the scale
parameter for backhaul is not small, an increase in local manufacturing rms increases
the price of local products. This is because the transport costs to the region where the
large number of manufacturing rms are located increase and then the price index in the
region increases. Furthermore, using (20), we obtain
@p12
@nM1
R 0, g(x) R 0
where g(x)   x3( )+x2 3
2
q
5
2
!+x [h  (  )(=   1)  K=2m]+ 2b+cK=m
2c
q
5
2
!
and x 
p
nM1 . Notice that g(x) is a cubic function of x. Now, we focus on some specic
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cases. If   , we readily obtain @p12=@nM1 > 0 because of g000(0) > 0, g00(0) > 0,
g0(0) > 0, and g(0) > 0. Whereas, if  >  and h   (   )(=   1)   K=2m > 0,
because g000(0) < 0, g00(0) > 0, g0(0) < 0, and g(0) > 0, we readily obtain @p12=@nM1 >
0 when nM1 is small enough and @p12=@n
M
1 < 0 when n
M
1 is large enough. If  > 
and h   (   )(=   1)   K=2m <  45
24
!
( ) , we also obtain @p12=@n
M
1 > 0 when
nM1 is small enough and @p12=@n
M
1 < 0 when n
M
1 is large enough because g
000(0) < 0,
g00(0) > 0, g0(x) < 0 and g(0) > 0. That is, the present model has the similar e¤ect of
the number of manufacturing rms on the price of local products to that in the model
of Ottaviano, Tabuch and Thisse (2002), if the number of local manufacturing rms are
small or the scale parameter for backhaul transportation is not smaller than that for
fronthaul transportation. Otherwise, the price of manufactured goods may decrease as
the number of manufacturing rms increases.
3.4. Capital returns and the number of transport rms
Substituting (4), (5), (6), (15), (18), and (20) into (7) and using the zero prot condition
yields the capital returns in region 1:
r1(s) =

2a+ t21(s)c(1  s)K=m
2(2b+ cK=m)
2
W=m+

2a  t12(s)(2b+ c(1  s)K=m)
2(2b+ cK=m)
2
W=m (27)
whereW  (b+cK=m)L=2. Furthermore, t21(s) is given by
p
5!(1  s)K=2m+h (1 
s)K=2m sK=2m if (1 s)K=m > 2!= and h (1 s)K=2m sK=2m if (1 s)K=m 
2!=. Similarly, t12(s) is given by
p
5!sK=2m + h   sK=2m   (1   s)K=2m if
sK=m > 2!=, and h  sK=2m  (1  s)K=2m if sK=m  2!=.
Substituting (5), (6), (15) and (20) into (10) and using zero prot condition yields the
equilibrium number of transport rms:
nT(s) =
sK
m
[t12(s)  c12(s)]W 
2a  t12(s) [2b+ c(1  s)K=m]
2(2b+ cK=m)
+
(1  s)K
m
[t21(s)  c21(s)]W 
2a  t21(s) [2b+ csK=m]
2(2b+ cK=m)
, (28)
where c12(s)  h   sK=2m   (1   s)K=2m + !k1 and c21(s)  h   (1   s)K=2m  
sK=2m + !k2. It is straight forward to see that t

12(s) = c

12(s) or t

21(s) = c

21(s) if
the transport market is perfectly competitive. That is, if the transport market on either
fronthaul or backhaul is under imperfect competition, transport rms exist. Otherwise,
transport rms do not exist in the economy because transport rms use an increasing-
returns technology under perfect competition in both transport markets. In the case of
perfect competition in both fronthaul and backhaul, if transport rms are exists, numerous
transporters such as the truck industry expressed in De Vany and Saving (1977), choose
a constant-returns technology. To analyze more complicated cases on industrial location,
we focus on transport rms which use an increasing-returns technology.
4. Industrial location
In this section, we nd when the core-periphery pattern is sustainable and when the
symmetric distribution of rms breaks. Because there are many types of change of trans-
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port charges under imperfect competition in the transport market, we focus on the case
when 4!= < K=m. That is, a competitive transport market emerges in the periphery,
whereas an imperfect competitive transport market emerges in the core. Furthermore,
the transport market is under imperfect competition in the symmetric pattern.
4.1. The sustainability of a core-periphery pattern
We derive conditions when a core-periphery pattern is sustainable. We start with
the core-periphery pattern where all manufacturing rms locate in region 1, positing
the situation in which s = 1. We obtain the gap of capital returns when all capital is
agglomerated in region 1:
[r1(s = 1)  r2(s = 1)]A =  (t12cp  t21cp)[4a  (t21cp+ t12cp)2b]  (t221cp+ t212cp)cK=m (29)
where A  4(2b + cK=m)=[(b + cK=m)L=2m], t12cp 
p
5!K=2m + h   K=2m and
t21cp  h   K=2m. So, we obtain rM1 (s = 1)   rM2 (s = 1) < 0 if transport charges are
the same in both transport markets. A di¤erence of transport costs may lead to a core-
periphery structure: from (29), we obtain rM1 (s = 1) rM2 (s = 1) < 0 if t12cp t21cp  0. In
other words, if transport charges from the core are larger than from the periphery, the core-
periphery structure is not sustainable. That is, if   , we always obtain t12cp  t21cp  0
and then rM1 (s = 1) < r
M
2 (s = 1). Hence, if the scale parameter for fronthaul is smaller
than that for backhaul, the core-periphery pattern does not exist. To avoid the ambiguity
in the case when  > , rewriting (29), we obtain
rM1 (s = 1)  rM2 (s = 1)

A = t21cp

4a  t21cp(2b+ cK=m)
  4at12cp + (2b  cK=m)t212cp,
which is a quadratic function of t12cp. The determinant of this quadratic function of t

12cp
is
D1=4 = 4a
2   4a(2b  cK=m)t21cp + (2b  cK=m)(2b+ cK=m)t221cp.
Furthermore, the determinant of D1=4 is
D2 =  32a2(2b  cK=m)cK=m.
Because D2 < 0 if 2b  cK=m > 0, we obtain D1 > 0 if 2b  cK=m > 0. Whereas, because
D2 > 0 if 2b  cK=m < 0, we obtain D1 > 0 if t21cp < 2a(2b cK=m) 2a
p
 2(2b cK=m)cK=m
(2b cK=m)(2b+cK=m) and
2b cK=m < 0. Furthermore, if 2b cK=m = 0, we have 2a(2b cK=m) 2a
p
 2(2b cK=m)cK=m
(2b cK=m)(2b+cK=m) >
2a
2b+cK=m
, so we obtain D1 > 0. Thus, using (29) and setting rM1 (s = 1) = r
M
2 (s = 1) yields
t12cp =
2a
p
D1=4
2b cK=m . If 2b   cK=m > 0, we nd that rM1 (s = 1) > rM2 (s = 1) equivalents
to 0 < t12cp <
2a 
p
D1=4
2b cK=m and r1(s = 1)  r2(s = 1) is equivalent to
2a 
p
D1=4
2b cK=m  t12cp <
2a
2b+cK=m
. Whereas, if 2b   cK=m < 0, we nd that rM1 (s = 1) > rM2 (s = 1) is equivalent
to 0 < t12cp <
2a 
p
D1=4
2b cK=m and r1(s = 1)  r2(s = 1) is equivalent to
2a 
p
D1=4
2b cK=m  t12cp <
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2a
2b+cK=m
. Furthermore, if 2b   cK=m = 0, we obtain rM1 (s = 1) R rM2 (s = 1)A ,
t21cp

4a  t21cp(2b+ cK=m)

=4a R t12cp.
Thus, supposing 2b 6= cK=m, we nd that the core-periphery pattern is sustainable if
0 < t12cp <
2a 
q
4a2   2(2b  cK=m)t21cp

4a  t21cp(2b+ cK=m)

2b  cK=m , (30)
whereas the core-periphery pattern is not sustainable if and only if
2a 
q
4a2   2(2b  cK=m)t21cp

4a  t21cp(2b+ cK=m)

2b  cK=m  t

12cp <
2a
2b+ cK=m
. (31)
If t21cp is close to zero, the left-hand side of (31) is also close to zero. Thus, the core-
periphery pattern is not sustainable in any case. Since D1=4 is decreasing in t21cp if
2b   cK=m > 0 whereas D1=4 is increasing in t21cp if 2b   cK=m < 0, the range of
t12cp for sustaining the core-periphery pattern expands as t

21cp increases.
4 Furthermore, if
2b = cK=m, we nd that the core-periphery pattern is sustainable if
0 < t12cp < t

21cp

a  t21cpb

=a, (32)
whereas the core-periphery pattern is not sustainable if
t21cp

a  t21cpb

=a  t12cp.
We obtain the same tendency if 2b 6= cK=m.
Since t12cp includes  and ! and t

21cp includes , combining (30) and the condition for
which imperfect competition in the transportation market emerges, we nd that core-
periphery pattern is sustained if the following condition is satised:
0 < ! < min
(
[T   (h  K=2m)]2
5K=2m
;K=4m
)
where T is the left-hand side of (31) or the right-hand side of (32). That is, the core-
periphery pattern is sustained if additional search costs are small enough.
4.2. The breaking of the symmetric pattern
We now examine the breaking of the symmetric pattern which is an equilibrium at
s = 0:5. To obtain the e¤ect of an increase s on rM1 (s = 0:5)   rM2 (s = 0:5), the capital
return, (27), is di¤erentiated around s = 0:5:
@r
@s
 4(2b+ cK=m)
W=m
=  t2sycK=m  2
@t12
@s
(a  tsyb) (33)
4Endogenizing transport costs by intorducing a search process, we nd that the core-periphery pattern
is an equilibrium when transport costs in transport market of the core is small enough, whereas the
core-peryphery pattern is not stable if transport costs in the transport market of the periphery are small
enough or if transport costs in the transport market of the core are large enough.
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where tsy  12
p
5!K=m+h K=4m K=4m = t12 = t21 and @t12=@s = 12
p
5!K=m 
(  )K=2m.
The rst term of (33) represents tough competition among rms, which is a dispersion
force, as in Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). That means, because manufacturing
rms relocate from region 2 to region 1, the competition in region 1 becomes tougher and
that in region 2 becomes milder. Thus, the symmetric pattern does not break. The rst
term of (33) is always negative. If we suppose @t12=@s = 0 such as in typical footloose
capital model, the symmetric pattern is always an equilibrium.
The last term of (33) represents the e¤ects of a change in transport costs on the capital
returns. The part of the last term on the right-hand side of (33) in parentheses is always
positive. This is because, since we choose parameters which satisfy p12 t12 > 0, p12 t12 >
0 equals a   t  b+ cnM2 =2 > 0, so a   tb is always positive. Therefore, the last term is
negative if @t12=@s > 0, whereas the last term is positive if @t12=@s < 0. That is, when
transport costs from region 1 to region 2 rise (fall) and transport costs from region 2 to
region 1 fall (rise) by the relocation of manufacturing rms to region 1, manufacturing
rms in region 1 may (not) have an incentive to relocate to region 2. Thus, dispersion or
agglomeration emerges, depending on the sign of @t12=@s.
Using (16), we obtain @t12=@s R 0 , ! Q [(   )2K=m]=5 if  > , whereas
@t12=@s > 0 if   . That is, the sign of a   tsyb is positive if ! > [(   )2K=m]=5
and  > , whereas it is non-positive if !  [(   )2K=m]=5 and  >  or if   .
In other words, agglomeration force by economy of transport density occurs if search costs
are large and the scale parameter for backhaul is larger than that for fronthaul, whereas
dispersion force by diseconomies of transport density occurs if search costs are small and
the scale parameter for franthaul is larger than that for backhaul or if the scale parameter
for backhaul is larger than that for fronthaul.
When the agglomeration force does not emerge, the symmetric pattern is always an
equilibrium. However, agglomeration forces may break the symmetric pattern. Summing
up agglomeration forces and dispersion forces, we examine the sign of @r=@sM around
s = 0:5 when @t12=@s < 0. Using @t12=@s = tsy   h  K=4m+ 3K=4m, the right-hand
side of (33) can be rewritten as
2Ha  2 (a+ bH) tsy + (2b  cK=m)t2sy  F (tsy),
where H  h + K=4m   3K=4m. We are interested in the case when @t12=@s < 0, so
we focus on tsy < H. It is straightforward to obtain F (tsy = 0) > 0; F 0(tsy = 0) < 0
and F (tsy = H) < 0. Furthermore, the determinant of F (tsy) is positive. Since F (tsy) is
quadratic function of tsy, the value of tsy such that F (tsy) = 0 is
tsy =
a+ bH  
q
(a  bH)2 + 2HacK=m
2b  cK=m .
Thus, we nd that @r=@s around s = 0:5 is positive when 0 < tsy < tsy, whereas it
is negative when tsy < tsy < H. Substituting tsy =
1
2
p
5!K=m+ h  K=4m  K=4m
into tsy R tsy yields
tsy R tsy , 4
 
tsy   h+ K=2m+ K=4m
2
=5 (K=m) R !:
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Thus, adding the condition for imperfect competition to emerge, we obtain that @r=@sM
around s = 0:5 is positive when
0 < ! < 4

tsy   h+ (+ )K=4m
2
=5 (K=m)
whereas @

rM1 (s = 1)  rM2 (s = 1)

=@sM is negative when
4

tsy   h+ (+ )K=4m
2
=5 (K=m) < ! < K=4m.
Using H, it is readily veried that 4

tsy   h+ (+ )K=4m
2
=5 (K=m) < K=4m.
Summarizing the derived results, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Endogenizing transport costs by introducing a search process, we nd that
the symmetric pattern is stable if 4

tsy   h+ (+ )K=4m
2
=5 (K=m)  !  K=4m,
whereas the symmetric pattern breaks if 0 < ! < 4

tsy   h+ (+ )K=4m
2
=5 (K=m).
5. Conclusion
We have presented a general spatial equilibrium model based with endogenized trans-
port costs determined by a search process. The main results of our paper can be sum-
marized as follows. The transport charges are decided under imperfect competition if
the number of manufacturing rms is large enough or the additional search costs are
small enough. The source of mark-up in transport charges stems from the possibility that
transport rms do not accept all requests from manufacturing rms. Otherwise, trans-
port charges are decided by marginal-cost pricing. Focusing on the case when transport
rm may not accept all requests, if the scale parameter on the cost for backhaul is not
smaller than that for fronthaul, transport charges decrease as the number of manufactur-
ing rms increases. Otherwise, transport charges increase (decrease) when the number
of manufacturing rms are small (large) as the number of manufacturing rms increases.
Economy of transport density works if search costs are large and the scale parameter for
backhaul is larger than that for fronthaul, whereas dispersion forces from diseconomies
of transport density occur if search costs are small and the scale parameter for fronthaul
is larger than that for backhaul or when the scale parameter for backhaul is larger than
that for fronthaul.
Choosing the range of additional search costs so that imperfect competition emerges in a
symmetric distribution of manufacturing rms, the transport charges from the periphery
are determined by marginal-cost pricing, however, the transport charges from the core
have a mark-up.
Then, if transport charges from the core are larger than those from the periphery, the
core-periphery structure is not sustainable. Likewise, if the scale parameter for fronthaul
is smaller than that for backhaul, the core-periphery pattern does not exist. The core-
periphery pattern is sustainable and symmetric patterns break, if additional search costs
are small enough. The range of transport charges for sending products from the core
to the periphery that sustainins the core-periphery pattern expands as transport charges
from the periphery increase.
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Owing to the many components of transport costs, our model does not capture all rele-
vant aspects. However, many other concepts in transport economics could be incorporated
into NEG models in future research.
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